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Remuneration review

Introduction and background

We have pleasure in presenting Aspen's remuneration review for 2021 in which the Group's Remuneration Policy ("the Policy"), and the manner in which it was implemented in 2021, are set out.

The Committee had a number of engagements with our investors, which provided us with very helpful insight into investors' views on remuneration at Aspen. We understand from the engagements that investors would like to see executive incentives that are aligned with Aspen's longer-term sustainable value creation. They also told us that the manner in which executives are incentivised needs to be clear, transparent and aligned with our strategy. Based on this feedback we have decided to make certain amendments to our remuneration philosophy and Policy, and to how we measure and disclose. It was also clear to us that we need to improve our disclosure regarding our processes and in particular our governance process, which we aim to achieve in this review.

We believe that the changes we have made to how we incentivise our executives ensures that they are aligned with our longer-term value creation.

We believe that the manner in which executive incentives are explained in this review is clear and transparent and connects them with our strategic objectives.

We are committed to continue improving our communication and disclosure, in particular regarding our governance processes, both through this review and in our future engagement with shareholders. We look forward to receiving feedback on our progress.

During the year under review our Remuneration & Nomination Committee focused on:

  • succession and capacity in the senior team, which included embedding the roles of the new senior Group executives;
  • considering the appointment of a new financial director to fill the vacancy arising as a consequence of the impending retirement of Gus Attridge, the Deputy Group Chief Executive, from the Board;
  • formalising the executive committee and addressing emergency and long-term succession for this committee, as well as the next layer of senior management;
  • organisational redesign; and
  • aligning our remuneration practices with shareholder expectations and market best practice.

These aspects and some of the other material activities undertaken by the Remuneration & Nomination Committee during the year are more fully dealt with in the Remuneration Committe report under the section titled Governance supporting our strategy.

Our remuneration philosophy

Aspen has a strong philosophy of aligning remuneration and incentives with our strategy.

The Board's annual strategy session, held in December of every year, is dedicated to the review and development of the Group's strategy, looking back at lessons learned - what worked well, what did not and matters requiring attention. Every new calendar year starts with the Group's Strategic Leadership Conference, where we bring together our Board, executives and leaders from our businesses across the globe (the approximately 50 people who constitute the Group's senior leadership team). Having processed and distilled the Board's strategy discussions at the prior year's December strategy session into actions with clearly defined targets and measurements, the Group Chief Executive and Deputy Group Chief Executive convey these strategic plans and targets to the extended leadership team. At this leadership conference, the attendees often provide very useful additional inputs, ideas and actions. The combined agreed actions from this conference form the basis of our strategic targets and how we measure performance against these targets.

In addition to being aligned with our strategy, our remuneration is structured around incentivising a performance culture in the Group. It also addresses the need to retain our competitive advantage in the local and global pharmaceutical industry by attracting and retaining high calibre individuals, who not only have the required technical qualifications and experience, but who also demonstrate the desired ethics and behavioural traits that fit our entrepreneurial and dynamic culture. We recognise that the remuneration of our executive directors, management and our employees is inextricably linked to our ability to attract, develop and retain talent.

We are also conscious of ensuring that our remuneration is competitive and aligned with the latest trends in benchmarks. In this regard, we acknowledge that the current remuneration mix in respect of our executives may require to be transitioned from where it is currently leaning more strongly towards a larger portion of guaranteed pay, towards a greater variable component in our remuneration packages, subject to performance measurement in alignment with corporate performance.

Our remuneration philosophy is also aimed at ensuring that measurements/KPIs applied for incentives are aligned with our strategic objectives, actions and business performance measurements. Our short-term incentives are mostly measured in terms of earnings growth and cash related KPIs and, while these focus on the achievement of the near-term goals we have set ourselves, some of our focus areas and performance measures run over a number of years, as our overall strategy is a journey that runs over time.

Our long-term incentives include measures in respect of some of our longer-term focus areas, which support our strategy. For these, we select suitable long-term KPIs, including return on invested capital and three-year compound annual growth in selected performance measures. In this area, pertinent ESG-related projects will be brought into our KPIs for long-term incentives.

From time to time, these activities involve focused projects where we seek to ensure step changes, such as the recent balance sheet de-gearing and supply chain optimisation initiatives. A great deal of time, effort and measurement goes into such projects. However, it is not always easy to formulate a clear single KPI for each project, especially in the short term. Often the only sensible measures are against a Board-approved plan with project milestones.

Of course, not all activities and projects find their way into the overall Group KPIs for incentive purposes, but may be included in personal key performance areas ("KPAs") or business unit KPIs, as appropriate. We have set an annual universal (Group) measurement, which carries a sizeable weighting in the performance measurement of every one of our executives. In addition, they have a portion of business unit measures and personal KPAs. Executive directors, of course, do not have business unit measures. The Committee carefully considers the input from our executive directors, investors and other stakeholders when identifying the key themes and KPIs and recommending to the Board those deemed to be most appropriate to drive the right behaviour by incentivising our executives to create sustainable value for investors and material stakeholders.

Another concept we are in the process of exploring in updating our remuneration philosophy is that of executives committing a greater portion of their annual guaranteed package to mandatory shareholding in Aspen. This concept is not only important for our investors, but is also aimed at ensuring that our executives have "skin in the game" and are therefore aligned at a very personal level with the strategy of the Group. We have already made some changes to our long-term incentive ("LTI") schemes, including the removal of the cash settlement option for South African executives and extending LTI award retention requirements for both South African and offshore executives.

Remuneration objectives

Establishing an appropriate balance between fair and competitive remuneration and reward with the aim of attracting and retaining the right employees, but which at the same time addresses affordability, is an important element of sustainable value creation.

The Group's remuneration objectives are to:

  • drive a high-performance culture through remuneration packages directly linked to individual and business performance and the achievement of predetermined targets in respect of each of these performance measures;
  • align the rewards of employees with the value delivered to the Group;
  • provide fair, responsible and competitive remuneration packages, which enable Aspen to attract and retain employees of the highest quality;
  • recognise and reward exceptional individual contributions to the achievement of the Group's strategic objectives; and
  • disclose our remuneration philosophy, policy and practices in order to provide stakeholders with an informed view of these aspects.

In endeavouring to set our remuneration packages at levels which are fair to all our employees, competitive and market-related, we refer to independent surveys, benchmarks, publicly available economic data and local and international marketplace intelligence. The ongoing review and adoption of remuneration guidelines in respect of levels and mix of remuneration and measurement of performance are informed by best practice, as well as the inputs received from shareholders following our engagements with them.

Employee wage rates across the Group comply with legislated wage rates in the jurisdictions in which we operate and, where applicable, employees are paid in accordance with rates agreed upon with trade unions and/or collective bargaining councils.

We continue to adopt guidelines, both in respect of the determination of base pay and our universal incentive structure, to ensure general alignment across the Aspen businesses, including the achievement of an overall Group performance objective.

When awarding annual salary increases, primary consideration is given to an employee's performance and achievement of his or her predetermined individual KPAs, with some consideration also being given to aspects such as:

  • predetermined performance measures adopted in respect of the Aspen business unit where the employee is employed; and
  • predetermined universal global performance measures for Group performance.

Remuneration structure and design

Remuneration package design and application consist of the following components:

Guaranteed pay and benefits
  • Total guaranteed pay ("TGP"), as approved by the Remuneration & Nomination Committee, comprises basic salary and benefits, including all types of leave, retirement schemes, medical benefits, car allowances, risk benefits, etc.
  • Benefits are aimed at assisting employees in improving financial well-being and security on retirement, as well as financial support in the event of illness (including medical aid contributions in certain countries), death or disability.
  • It is cash settled and reflects the market value of each role, reviewed annually, with reference to:
    • achievement of predetermined individual KPAs and business performance measures;
    • inflationary considerations;
    • industry and regional benchmarking.
Variable pay

Short-term incentives (STI)

Current STI schemes applicable to the 2021 financial year

  • Performance-based, measured against predetermined objectives, aligned to grade and the specific role of each participant.
  • STI schemes allow for annual cash settled awards aimed at creating a high-performance culture through a cash bonus that rewards employees for achieving predetermined:
    • individual KPAs;
    • enterprise or business unit ("BU") performance measures based on a balanced scorecard;
    • Group targets as measured against a balanced scorecard.
  • Eligible for STIs: Permanent employees from middle to senior and executive management, including executive directors.
  • Clawback and malus provisions allow for incentive awards (partially or in their entirety, depending on the circumstances) to be cancelled and/or recovered from an employee found to be guilty of dishonesty, misconduct, incompetence, negligence or causing harm to Aspen's reputation. These provisions apply in equal measure to all participants of the relevant schemes.
  • KPIs used to measure the Group's performance2 during the year under review:
    • Organic growth achieved in normalised EBITDA from continuing operations measured in CER (Group budget represents 100%) – 50% of weighting;
    • Measured free cash flow, appropriately adjusted for disposals, acquisitions and strategic capex approved by the Board (Group budget represents 100%) – 20% of weighting;
    • Three-year CAGR in Group revenue for continuing operations (Group budget represents 100% – for the three-year CAGR KPI, the applicable actual Group revenue will be used in the base year) – 20% of weighting;
    • Improvement in the Group's FTSE/JSE investment responsible index score (as ESG measure) – 10% of weighting.
  • The Remuneration & Nomination Committee's role in respect to STIs is to:
    • approve the rules and any changes to rules in respect of the STIs;
    • review and approve the individual business unit KPIs and Group performance measures to be applied for the following year; and
    • assess the performance of the executive directors and make incentive awards in line with their performance against predetermined performance measures.

 

Enhancements to STI schemes to take effect in the next financial year

  • STI stretch awards (with varying caps depending on grade, but up to a maximum total award of 150% the executive directors and as further detailed here are possible for selected international executives and Group senior executives in instances where there has been outperformance against final KPIs.
  • A minimum individual KPA performance score of 75% is required to participate in the STI incentive, while only executives achieving an individual KPA score of 100% are allowed to participate in the stretch awards.
  • A minimum overall business unit score of 85% is required for business unit KPI to be included in STI awards.
  • At least 100% achievement required for business unit KPI to participate in the stretch award, where applicable.
  • Additional minimum participation levels set for business units with varying principles applicable to commercial business units, manufacturing business units and Group functional business units.
  • For the relevant senior management and executives of a business unit to have the STI awarded, the primary financial performance measure for that business unit must be improved upon versus prior year actual financial performance. Motivations may be made to the Remuneration & Nomination Committee for the approval of exceptions.
  • Group KPIs for STIs amended to:
    • Organic growth achieved in normalised EBITDA from continuing operations measured in CER and against budget – 70% of weighting;
    • Measured free cash flow per share, as measured against budget – 30% of weighting.
  • Stretch STI awards will be made based on the level of outperformance against primary financial KPI for Commercial business units, approved KPIs for all other business units and the EBITDA KPI for the Group component.


Long-term incentives (LTIs – formerly referred to as medium-term incentives or MTIs)

Current LTI schemes applicable to the 2021 financial year

  • The Group operates two LTI schemes:
    • the South African Management Deferred Incentive Bonus scheme ("SAMDIBS") for senior managers and executives (including the executive directors) based in South Africa;
    • the International Phantom Share Scheme ("IPSS") for senior managers and executives not based in South Africa.
  • The terms and conditions of these schemes are similar in all material respects, except that vested awards in terms of the SAMDIBS are share settled, while vested awards in terms of the IPSS are settled in cash on a phantom share basis.
  • SAMDIBS participants can opt to have the bonus awarded and settled in cash (with no reference to the share price) or in shares. To encourage the holding of shares, a 10% enhancement is given to employees who elect to receive the award in shares. This option was disallowed in terms of the 2021 financial year's award in terms of a dispensation issued by the JSE, enabling Aspen to grant these awards during a prohibited period as a result of the Company trading under a cautionary announcement and awards to all participants have been made as share settled awards.
  • Schemes are designed to acknowledge and reward:
    • individual performance; and
    • the performance of the employee's business unit.
  • The LTI schemes currently have, in all material respects, the same performance measures as the STI scheme, except for the introduction of a three-year deferral aimed at retaining critical executive and professional skills and ensuring congruence between the interests of executive and managerial employees and shareholders.
  • Participation in the scheme is dependent on seniority of the executive or manager and is determined with caps in place, which vary according to the level of seniority.
  • Shares acquired for purposes of the SAMDIBS share settlements are acquired on-market by an intermediary - no shares are issued and the scheme has no dilutive effect.
  • Unvested awards are forfeited by employees who resign or who are dismissed. No-fault terminations of employment such as retrenchment, retirement or medical incapacity results in the accelerated vesting of awards due at the date of such termination.
  • Both schemes have senior executive retention components, which allow for additional share settled awards over a five-, seven- and ten-year period. These awards are made to a limited number of key South African and offshore employees on an ad hoc basis, with no new awards being made in terms of these components since the 2019 financial year.
  • During the 2020 financial year, the South African Phantom Share Scheme was introduced with the intention of, under exceptional circumstances, compensating employees for medium- or long-term incentives, held at previous employers and which are forfeited as a result of the employee accepting a position at Aspen. These awards operate as phantom shares, with the value of the award being referenced to the Aspen share price. They can be settled as a cash payment or as a purchase of shares following an agreed vesting period. No new awards were made under this scheme during the 2021 financial year.

 

Enhancements to LTI schemes to take effect in the next financial year

  • Additional layers of awards now consist of annual LTI awards (with varying caps depending on grade, but up to a maximum total award of 82,5% for executive directors as further detailed here consisting of the following variable components:
    • LTI first layer – calculated on the same basis as the STI, capped at current LTI maximum before the application of stretch principles, not forfeitable;
    • LTI second layer – introduces a layer of forfeitable awards conditional on sustained three-year performance against predetermined Group KPIs;
    • LTI second layer stretch – introduces an additional layer of forfeitable stretch awards conditional on sustained three-year outperformance against predetermined Group KPIs.
  • Group KPIs for the first layer LTI awards will be:
    • Organic growth achieved in normalised EBITDA from continuing operations measured in CER and measured against budget &nd 70% of weighting
    • Measured free cash flow per share, as measured against budget – 30% of weighting
  • Group KPIs for the on-target achievement of the second layer LTI forfeitable awards will be:
    • ROIC relative to weighted average cost of capital ("WACC"), where WACC has been approved as appropriate for impairment testing, with the target being WACC + 1% – 30% of weighting
    • Three-year CAGR of 5% in NHEPS (CER) from continuing operations – 50% of weighting
    • Appropriate ESG measure approved by the Board with identified milestones as target – 20% of weighting
  • Each of the KPIs in the second layer is separately measured and the award for each of these KPIs is independent of the performance achieved in the other two KPIs.
  • Group KPIs for the stretch component of the forfeitable LTI awards will be:
    • ROIC relative to WACC, where WACC has been approved as appropriate for impairment testing, with:
      • Stretch target 1 = WACC + 2% to <3%
      • Stretch target 2 = WACC +3% or greater
    • Three-year CAGR rate in NHEPS (CER) from continuing operations
      • Stretch target 1 = 7,5% to <10%
      • Stretch target 2 = 10% or greater
    • ESG measure excluded from stretch targets - should determined milestones be achieved, awarded stretch allocation will be based on 40% of ROIC stretch participation level and 60% of NHEPS stretch participation level - where no stretch achieved for one or either of ROIC and NHEPS, ESG measure target level will be applied.
  • Various measures to determine the final adjusted award for a second layer award over the three-year vesting period have been approved - should the finally determined second layer award be less than the initial award, the number of shares which vest will be reduced accordingly.
  • Conditional LTI awards vest conditionally on maintenance of performance level over the three-year vesting period and subject to adjustment if not maintained.
  • 50% of conditional LTI shares that vest will only be released for trade in year 4 (25%) and year 5 (25%), introducing an extended minimum shareholding period.
  • The cash election option available to participants of the SAMDIBS has been removed, with the additional 10% enhancement factored into the first layer of the LTI award.

1 Employee benefits vary from region to region and are dependent on in-country customs, tax regulations and labour legislation.

2 These KPIs do not apply to executive directors – please refer to Remuneration implementation report where these KPIs for executive directors are detailed.


Definitions and formulas for purposes of calculating of Group KPIs

  • Organic growth: organic growth achieved in normalised EBITDA from continuing operations measured in CER - excludes EBITDA from disposed products, businesses disclosed as discontinued operations and any product acquisitions with pre-existing revenue in the country concerned.
  • Free cash flow per share ("FCFPS"): measured free cash flow, appropriately adjusted for disposals and acquisitions approved by the Board, where free cash flow = (Cash generated from operating activities – Capex)/average number of shares in issue over the measurement period and where Capex = PPE capex + computer software capex + development costs of other intangible assets.
  • ROIC: Return/Invested capital and where: Return = Operating profit x (1 – effective tax rate) on the basis that operating profit includes profits/losses on disposal of assets.
  • Invested capital: total shareholders' equity – accumulated currency translation gains/(losses) + total interest-bearing-debt – capital work in progress + deferred acquisition payables – cash and cash equivalents – deferred disposal proceeds; calculated as invested capital being the average of the opening invested capital and the closing invested capital for the period of the return being measured.
  • CAGR in NHEPS (CER): Three-year CAGR in CER NHEPS from continuing operations.

Executive director remuneration

Our executive directors are contracted as full-time, permanent employees and receive no additional remuneration as directors of the Company. Restraint of trade provisions are included in our service agreements with these directors, while notice periods are six months' written notice. Shorter notice periods may apply in the event of termination due to disciplinary procedures being instituted.

Bonus payments and the vesting of long-term incentives that are in place at the time of an individual's termination of service are subject to the rules of the relevant scheme. These contracts do not commit the Company to:

  • pay additional remuneration on termination arising from the director's failure to perform agreed duties;
  • make any form of balloon payments; or
  • make payments to executive directors in the event of a change of control of the Company.

The principles in terms of which the remuneration packages of the executive directors are determined are similar to those applicable to the Group's management as a whole.

The financial and non-financial performance measures in respect of the executive directors' incentive bonuses are considered and approved by the Committee on an annual basis. The achievement of the 2021 performance measures and an explanation of the effect this achievement had on the incentive bonuses paid to executive directors for 2021 are dealt with in this table.

Non-executive directors' fees

The fees paid to these directors have been designed to ensure that Aspen can attract, retain and fairly reward capable and skilled non-executive directors. This is done by a regular benchmarking of directors' fees against peers.

The Chairman of the Board receives a fixed annual fee for his role as Chairman. Other non-executive directors' fees are fixed for the year and include a quarterly base fee, payable to each non-executive director, in addition to a fee per meeting attended. Further fees are paid for attendance at unscheduled meetings depending on the number of hours spent at the meeting, up to a maximum of the set fee per meeting. In the instance of non-attendance, non-executive directors are obliged to continue to participate in meetings by providing the Chairman of the Board (in case of Board meetings) or the relevant Committee Chair with detailed inputs for all agenda items. The proposed fees payable to these directors for the 2022 financial year have been recommended for shareholder approval and will be submitted for approval at Aspen's annual general meeting ("AGM") to be held on 9 December 2021 (see the AGM notice which provides the detailed proposals to shareholders in this regard).

Shareholder voting on remuneration matters

Our Remuneration Policy and Implementation Report are subject to two separate non-binding advisory votes by shareholders at Aspen's AGM, while a special resolution approving the fees of the non-executive directors is also submitted for approval at this meeting of shareholders.

The results of the voting in respect of the non-binding advisory votes were as follows:

Remuneration Policy For Against Abstain Total
2020 73,92% 26,08% 0,12% 100%
2019 78,98% 21,02% 0,05% 100%
Remuneration Implementation Report For Against Abstain Total
2020 59,75% 40,25% 0,15% 100%
2019 92,98% 7,02% 0,15% 100%

The current Remuneration Policy and Implementation Report will be tabled for separate non-binding advisory votes at the Company's 2021 AGM, scheduled for 9 December 2021. Any material shareholder concerns about either of these two documents specifically in instances where these are voted against by 25% or more of the voting rights exercised, will be considered and addressed by means of constructive engagement with the relevant shareholder or shareholders. The nature and outcomes of these engagements will be reported on in our Integrated Report of the following financial year.

Following a number of constructive engagements held with shareholders in respect of remuneration since the 2020 AGM, the following enhancements to the Group's approach to remuneration and its disclosures have been made:

  • a clear distinction has been drawn between measures for assessing short-term performance and measures for assessing long-term performance, with organic growth achieved in normalised EBITDA from continuing operations and free cash flow per share being set as the Group's short-term KPI measures, while ROIC relative to WACC, the three-year CAGR of 5% in CER NEHPS from continuing operations and a Board approved ESG measure have been introduced for purposes of determining awards to be made in terms of the second layer of forfeitable LTI awards as explained in this table;
  • the Group's LTI schemes have been redesigned to introduce forfeitable components, as explained here;
  • changes have been made to our LTI schemes to ensure a level of enduring executive shareholding:
    • removal of the cash settlement option for South African executives; and
    • introduction of measures which will result in 50% of conditional LTI shares, which vest in year 3 only being released for trade in year 4 (25%) and year 5 (25%), to support the achievement of this objective;
  • the Implementation Report discloses the specific performance achieved against targets set in respect of each of the KPIs for STIs and LTIs, with a range disclosed in respect of each of these KPIs;
  • KPIs such as ROIC, CAGR in NHEPS (CER) and what constitutes organic growth for purposes of measuring short-term and long-term incentives have been defined in detail here;
  • the senior executive retention components of the LTI schemes have been explained here and here as components that allow for additional share settled awards over a five-, seven- and ten-year period. Awards in terms of these components have been made to a limited number of key South African and offshore employees on an ad hoc basis, with no new awards being made in terms of these components since the 2019 financial year;
  • detailed reporting has been provided on our remuneration philosophy and how that is aligned with our core business strategy, including the processes followed in setting performance targets through our annual strategy session of the Board, followed by the Group's Strategic Leadership Conference where the combined efforts of these processes form the basis of our strategic targets and how we measure performance against these targets; and
  • the reporting structure in respect of the Remuneration review and the narrative contained in it has undergone extensive redrafting in order to be more focused, concise and clear.
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